De Hoyos v. Mukasey
--- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 5120768 (C.A.5)
De Hoyos became an LPR in 1993.
On May 16, 2000, De Hoyos was convicted of possession of marijuana in an amount greater than 50 pounds, a second degree felony under the Texas Controlled Substances Act. De Hoyos was later placed in removal proceedings, sought cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a), and was granted this form of relief by an Immigration Judge on April 24, 2001.
On October 29, 2004 and December 10, 2004, De Hoyos was convicted of stealing several cases of beer. De Hoyos was placed in removal proceedings for a second time. He was charged with removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) – two previous convictions for CIMTs not arising out of a single scheme of conduct. The charge was sustained. As relief from removal De Hoyos sought adjustment of status, coupled with a waiver under INA § 212(h). The waiver was intended to avoid a finding of inadmissibility for the two CIMTs, and allow De Hoyos to adjust status. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The IJ denied De Hoyos's application for adjustment of status, finding him inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) – inadmissibility due to a controlled substance offense. The BIA affirmed.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (CA5) denied De Hoyos's petition for review, on what seems to be different grounds. Citing Matter of Balderas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 389 (BIA 1991), the CA5 held that “a conviction that was the focus of a previous waiver under § 212(c) may still be grounds of inadmissibility that statutorily precludes an alien's acquisition of § 212(h) relief in further removal proceedings. Furthermore, we agree with the IJ that “[a]lthough the Balderas decision applied to the predecessor of § 240A (former § 212(c)), the Board's rationale applies with equal force to the effect of cancellation of removal on an underlying conviction.”
NOTE: The CA5 held that De Hoyos was inadmissible and that he was ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver because of his conviction for possession of marijuana in an amount greater than 50 pounds. This is an incorrect application of Matter of Balderas. Under this decision a grant of § 212(c) waiver with regard to a conviction has the following effects:
Waiver of the finding of excludability or deportability stemming from the respective criminal conviction. Id. At 391;
If the alien is charged with excludability (charges under § 212(a)(2)) and obtains a § 212(c) waiver, the waiver is also granted as to deportability (charges under § 237(a)). If the alien is charged with deportability and obtains a § 212(c) waiver, the waiver is also granted as to excludability. “We believe that if [§ 212(c)] is exercised to waive a ground of inadmissibility based upon a criminal conviction, a deportation proceeding cannot thereafter be properly instituted based upon the same criminal conviction unless, of course, the Attorney General has revoked the previous grant of relief.” Matter of G-A-, 74 I. & N. Dec. 274, 275 (BIA 1956). “[I]f a single act can be the basis of both excludability and deportability, and excludability is waived by the Attorney General, then that act, without more, cannot be the basis of a deportation charge.” Matter of Mascorro-Perales, 12 I. & N. Dec. 228 (BIA 1967;
Once a waiver of excludability or deportability for certain acts was granted, that waiver would remain effective for all subsequent entries. “To require an alien who has been granted a waiver (…) to reapply on each re-entry after a temporary absence would constitute an undue burden, curtail the beneficial effects of this remedial legislation, and unduly hamper travel. It is concluded, therefore, that during such time as the order granting the waiver remains unrevoked, it be regarded as in full force and effect as to any subsequent entries if no new grounds for excludability have arisen, and the alien is complying with the conditions under which the waiver was granted. In such circumstances, no new application for waiver of excludability is required.” Matter of P-, 10 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 1957).
Once the waiver is granted, the alien cannot be found to be subject to removal for the exact same crime, based on the exact same ground of removal that was initially charged by the Government. In Matter of Mascorro-Perales, an alien was granted a waiver under INA § 212(h), after having been placed in removal proceedings and charged with committing a CIMT. The waiver was granted. The alien was later convicted for a second CIMT, and removal proceedings were again initiated. In these proceedings the charge of removability was different (two CIMTs), but was partially based on the alien's first conviction. “Respondent was granted a waiver of excludability on the basis of a single conviction for crime involving moral turpitude, and that waiver has been honored. By the waiver, his 1961 return to the United States was legalized, and he was placed in the same situation as if he had not left the country. He was not deportable for having been excludable, and not deportable on the basis of the conviction itself. However, respondent has now become deportable because of his own act, because of his commission (and conviction of) a second crime involving moral turpitude. He is not deportable for having committed the original crime, but for having been convicted of two crimes, both involving moral turpitude.” “A grant of a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Act fully returns an alien to the same lawful permanent resident status previously held. Matter of Przygocki. Once a waiver of inadmissibility is granted with respect to certain crimes, deportation proceedings must be initiated anew to consider subsequent offenses... This grant of section 212(c) relief restored the respondent to his previous status of that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The waiver did not carry with it the condition that if the respondent were convicted of another crime in the future, he would be subject to deportation on the same grounds already waived.” Matter of Gordon, 20 I. & N. Dec. 52, 55-56 (BIA 1989).
The IJ, BIA, and CA5 decided that De Hoyos is inadmissible because of his conviction for possession of marijuana in an amount greater than 50 pounds. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). This conviction had previously been used by the Government as the basis for a charge of deportability, but was waived by an Immigration Judge after De Hoyos sought Cancellation of Removal. INA § 240A(a). This holding is incorrect under Mascorro-Perales and Gordon. See numeral 4 above.
Of course, I might be missing something.
Thursday, December 18, 2008
Monday, December 15, 2008
Aggravated Felonies
RENTERIA-MORALES V. MUKASEY
--- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 5192056 (C.A.9),
The petitions of Irma Renteria-Morales and Maria Jesus Rivera de Alvarado, were consolidated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (CA9)
Irma Renteria-Morales
Renteria became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. On January 13, 1998, Renteria pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (Bail Jumping). On March 3, 1998, the government filed a notice to appear alleging that Renteria was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an aggravated felon. The government claimed that a violation of § 3146 constituted the aggravated felony of “failure to appear” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(T). The IJ sustained the charge and pretermitted Renteria's application for cancellation of removal. Renteria appealed to the BIA. The appeal was dismissed. Renteria filed a petition for review.
To establish whether Renteria had been properly found removable as an aggravated felon, the CA9 first applied the categorical approach to determine whether the elements of the offense under § 1101(a)(43)(T) are broader than the elements of the crime under 18 U.S.C. § 3146 . The CA9 held that the following are elements of the offense under § 1101(a)(43)(T): (1) a failure to appear in court; (2) pursuant to a court order; (3) to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony; (4) where the felony was one for which a sentence of two years' imprisonment or more may be imposed. The CA9 then transcribed the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3146, and held that the elements of this statute are broader than the elements of § 1101(a)(43)(T).
The CA9 then found it necessary to go beyond the mere fact of conviction and consider whether Renteria, by having been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 3146, was necessarily convicted of all the elements of § 1101(a)(43)(T). (Modified categorical approach). The CA9 held that, according the the evidence available in the record, the government did not establish that Renteria was under a “court order” or that she was ordered to appear “to answer to or dispose of” a charge (see elements above). In consequence, the government failed to meet its burden of proof and petition for review was granted.
The dissent opined that it was reasonable to infer from the documentation provided by the government (criminal information) that Renteria was ordered by a judge to appear in court to answer or dispose of a charge of possession of marihuana.
Maria Jesus Rivera de Alvarado
Rivera became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1967. She pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146. She was sentenced to a $100.00 assessment and a term of imprisonment of twelve months and one day. The government charged Rivera under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) – crime involving moral turpitude; and under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) - “reason to believe illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.” The IJ sustained both charges. Respondent filed an application for cancellation of removal. The IJ found that Respondent's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3146, constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43)(S) as an offense relating to obstruction of justice. Rivera appealed to the BIA the denial of her application for cancellation of removal. The BIA upheld the IJ's decision. Rivera filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (CA9).
To determine whether Rivera had committed an aggravated felony the CA9 applied its categorical approach to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 3146, contains all the elements of 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43)(S). The CA9 held that the elements of obstruction of justice crimes (§ 1101(a)(43)(S)) include either active interference with proceedings of a tribunal or investigation, or action or threat of action against those who would cooperate in the process of justice. Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 893 (BIA 1999). Such crimes include an intent element, defined as a specific intent to interfere with the process of justice. Id.
The elements of § 3146, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, are the following: the government ordinarily must prove that the defendant (1) was released; (2) was required to appear in court, (3) knew that he was required to appear, (4) failed to appear as required, and (5) was willful in his failure to appear.
Failure to appear before a court as required by the conditions of release, and failure to obey a court order to surrender for service, both constitute active interference with the proceedings of a tribunal. Section 3146 also includes the requisite mens rea: the specific intent to interfere with the process of justice.” Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 893. Therefore, the CA9 found that because § 3146 fulfills the elements of the generic offense of “obstruction of justice,” a conviction under § 3146 is categorically an offense relating to obstruction of justice under § 1101(a)(43)(S).
The CA9 held that the second component of § 1101(a)(43)(S), that the offense be one “for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year,” is a statutory requirement, rather than an element of the generic federal offense. In consequence, the court does not use the categorical and modified categorical approach to determine whether a petitioner has met any sentencing requirement specified in § 1101(a)(43)(S). Instead, the court uses tools of statutory construction to evaluate whether the petitioner's prior crime of conviction meets any statutory requirement in § 1101(a)(43) that are not elements of a generic federal crime. The CA9 also held that this phrase refers to the actual sentence imposed by the judge on the defendant convicted of the predicate offense, rather than the potential sentence that the judge could have imposed. Rivera was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twelve months and one day, and therefore meets the statutory sentencing requirement in § 1101(a)(43)(S). Petition for review denied.
--- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 5192056 (C.A.9),
The petitions of Irma Renteria-Morales and Maria Jesus Rivera de Alvarado, were consolidated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (CA9)
Irma Renteria-Morales
Renteria became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. On January 13, 1998, Renteria pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (Bail Jumping). On March 3, 1998, the government filed a notice to appear alleging that Renteria was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an aggravated felon. The government claimed that a violation of § 3146 constituted the aggravated felony of “failure to appear” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(T). The IJ sustained the charge and pretermitted Renteria's application for cancellation of removal. Renteria appealed to the BIA. The appeal was dismissed. Renteria filed a petition for review.
To establish whether Renteria had been properly found removable as an aggravated felon, the CA9 first applied the categorical approach to determine whether the elements of the offense under § 1101(a)(43)(T) are broader than the elements of the crime under 18 U.S.C. § 3146 . The CA9 held that the following are elements of the offense under § 1101(a)(43)(T): (1) a failure to appear in court; (2) pursuant to a court order; (3) to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony; (4) where the felony was one for which a sentence of two years' imprisonment or more may be imposed. The CA9 then transcribed the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3146, and held that the elements of this statute are broader than the elements of § 1101(a)(43)(T).
The CA9 then found it necessary to go beyond the mere fact of conviction and consider whether Renteria, by having been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 3146, was necessarily convicted of all the elements of § 1101(a)(43)(T). (Modified categorical approach). The CA9 held that, according the the evidence available in the record, the government did not establish that Renteria was under a “court order” or that she was ordered to appear “to answer to or dispose of” a charge (see elements above). In consequence, the government failed to meet its burden of proof and petition for review was granted.
The dissent opined that it was reasonable to infer from the documentation provided by the government (criminal information) that Renteria was ordered by a judge to appear in court to answer or dispose of a charge of possession of marihuana.
Maria Jesus Rivera de Alvarado
Rivera became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1967. She pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146. She was sentenced to a $100.00 assessment and a term of imprisonment of twelve months and one day. The government charged Rivera under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) – crime involving moral turpitude; and under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) - “reason to believe illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.” The IJ sustained both charges. Respondent filed an application for cancellation of removal. The IJ found that Respondent's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3146, constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43)(S) as an offense relating to obstruction of justice. Rivera appealed to the BIA the denial of her application for cancellation of removal. The BIA upheld the IJ's decision. Rivera filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (CA9).
To determine whether Rivera had committed an aggravated felony the CA9 applied its categorical approach to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 3146, contains all the elements of 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43)(S). The CA9 held that the elements of obstruction of justice crimes (§ 1101(a)(43)(S)) include either active interference with proceedings of a tribunal or investigation, or action or threat of action against those who would cooperate in the process of justice. Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 893 (BIA 1999). Such crimes include an intent element, defined as a specific intent to interfere with the process of justice. Id.
The elements of § 3146, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, are the following: the government ordinarily must prove that the defendant (1) was released; (2) was required to appear in court, (3) knew that he was required to appear, (4) failed to appear as required, and (5) was willful in his failure to appear.
Failure to appear before a court as required by the conditions of release, and failure to obey a court order to surrender for service, both constitute active interference with the proceedings of a tribunal. Section 3146 also includes the requisite mens rea: the specific intent to interfere with the process of justice.” Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 893. Therefore, the CA9 found that because § 3146 fulfills the elements of the generic offense of “obstruction of justice,” a conviction under § 3146 is categorically an offense relating to obstruction of justice under § 1101(a)(43)(S).
The CA9 held that the second component of § 1101(a)(43)(S), that the offense be one “for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year,” is a statutory requirement, rather than an element of the generic federal offense. In consequence, the court does not use the categorical and modified categorical approach to determine whether a petitioner has met any sentencing requirement specified in § 1101(a)(43)(S). Instead, the court uses tools of statutory construction to evaluate whether the petitioner's prior crime of conviction meets any statutory requirement in § 1101(a)(43) that are not elements of a generic federal crime. The CA9 also held that this phrase refers to the actual sentence imposed by the judge on the defendant convicted of the predicate offense, rather than the potential sentence that the judge could have imposed. Rivera was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twelve months and one day, and therefore meets the statutory sentencing requirement in § 1101(a)(43)(S). Petition for review denied.
Wednesday, December 3, 2008
Apuntes sobre Detenciones
DIALOGOS SIN FRONTERA
INMIGRACION
Apuntes sobre Detenciones
Nuestra firma ha recibido numerosas consultas sobre el tema de detenciones por autoridades de inmigracion. Debido a la diversidad de las preguntas formuladas por nuestros lectores, haremos un resumen general sobre este tema, enfocandonos en los aspectos mas importantes.
Cuando un extranjero esta en los Estados Unidos en violacion de las leyes de inmigracion esta sujeto a ser detenido por las autoridades de inmigracion de este pais. Dependiendo del lugar y las circunstancias del arresto, el extranjero puede verse privado de la libertad por agentes del “Immigration and Customs Enforcement” (ICE), o del “Customs and Border Patrol” (CBP). Después del arresto inicial el extranjero es transferido a un centro de detenciones. Generalmente, para habitantes de Miami, esto significa encarcelamiento en el Centro de Detenciones de Krome (Miami, Florida), o en el Broward Transitional Center (Pompano Beach, Florida). Una vez arribe al centro de detenciones respectivo, el extranjero estara bajo la jurisdicción exclusiva de ICE.
EXTRANJEROS BAJO ORDEN DE DEPORTACION
Si el extranjero detenido tiene orden de deportación, ICE lo mantendra detenido hasta que (1) ICE logre coordinar la deportación fisica de la persona al pais respectivo, (2) hasta que ICE apruebe una orden de supervisión, o (3) hasta que un juez de inmigracion reabra el caso de deportación en contra del extranjero y se logre obtener la libertad bajo fianza.
Orden de Supervisión
ICE puede darle libertad a un extranjero con orden de deportación bajo la figura de la orden de supervision. Este beneficio regularmente es utilizado por ICE cuando es difícil hacer efectiva la orden de deportación, o cuando hay razones humanitarias apremiantes que lo justifican. El caso tipico de la orden de supervisión es cuando hay una orden de deportación en contra de una persona de nacionalidad Cubana. Como es imposible hacer efectiva esa orden de deportación, ICE se ve en la necesidad de conceder ordenes de supervisión a estos individuos, dandoles asi libertad.
Es importante anotar que regularmente una persona con orden de supervisión tiene derecho a permiso de trabajo. Tambien es importante anotar que el extranjero debe cumplir cabalmente con todas las condiciones impuestas por ICE al aprobar la orden de supervisión, de lo contrario puede verse nuevamente detenido.
Reapertura del Caso
Cuando un extranjero tiene orden de deportación generalmente es porque un juez de inmigracion la impuso. El juez de inmigracion impone la orden de deportación al final de un proceso de deportación. La orden de deportación constituye el ultimo acto del juez en este tipo de proceso. Sin embargo, hay circunstancias en las que el extranjero que ha sido ordenado deportado puede solicitarle al juez de inmigracion que borre la orden de deportación y escuche nuevamente el caso. Hay unas razones limitadas que pueden ser alegadas por el extranjero como base de una solicitud de reapertura de su caso. Si alguna de esas razones no esta presente no hay lugar a este remedio.
En ocasiones, ICE le otorga libertad a extranjeros que han solicitado reapertura de sus casos. Generalmente esto se logra cuando hay consideraciones humanitarias extremas que justifican la libertad del extranjero a pesar de estar sujeto a una orden final de deportación.
Si el juez de inmigracion decide reabrir el caso de deportación, el extranjero debe solicitar una fianza para obtener su libertad. No todos los extranjeros califican para obtener una fianza. Esta determinación debe ser hecha por el extranjero junto con su abogado de inmigración.
EXTRANJEROS SIN ORDEN DE DEPORTACION
Cuando el extranjero no tiene orden de deportación y es detenido por ICE o por el CBP, lo mas seguro es que le sea iniciado un proceso de deportación. El proceso de deportación es iniciado por ICE, y presidido por un juez de inmigracion. Durante el proceso de deportación el extranjero seguira detenido por ICE.
En el momento en que el extranjero es detenido por ICE o por CBP, un oficial determinara si el extranjero califica para la libertad bajo fianza. Si esta opcion de libertad es otorgada, el extranjero debera pagar la fianza respectiva para que le sea reestablecida la libertad.
Si ICE le niega la libertad bajo fianza al extranjero, este podra solicitarle al juez de inmigracion que determine definitivamente el tema de la libertad bajo fianza.
Invitamos a nuestros lectores a enviarnos un correo electrónico o llamarnos.
Jeffrey C. Hammond y Carlos Mauricio Duque son abogados de inmigración en la firma de abogados del Doral, Duque & Hammond, P.A. Puede llamarlos al (305)436-0155 o escribirles a info@dhvisa.com Usted tambien puede visitar nuestra oficina: 3785 NW 82 AVE #201, Doral, Florida 33166.
Por favor tengan en cuenta que la contratación de un abogado es una decisión importante que no debe basarse solamente en un aviso publicitario o en cualquier información contenida en este articulo. Antes de que usted decida, pídanos que le enviemos información escrita gratuita sobre nuestras calificaciones y nuestra experiencia.
INMIGRACION
Apuntes sobre Detenciones
Nuestra firma ha recibido numerosas consultas sobre el tema de detenciones por autoridades de inmigracion. Debido a la diversidad de las preguntas formuladas por nuestros lectores, haremos un resumen general sobre este tema, enfocandonos en los aspectos mas importantes.
Cuando un extranjero esta en los Estados Unidos en violacion de las leyes de inmigracion esta sujeto a ser detenido por las autoridades de inmigracion de este pais. Dependiendo del lugar y las circunstancias del arresto, el extranjero puede verse privado de la libertad por agentes del “Immigration and Customs Enforcement” (ICE), o del “Customs and Border Patrol” (CBP). Después del arresto inicial el extranjero es transferido a un centro de detenciones. Generalmente, para habitantes de Miami, esto significa encarcelamiento en el Centro de Detenciones de Krome (Miami, Florida), o en el Broward Transitional Center (Pompano Beach, Florida). Una vez arribe al centro de detenciones respectivo, el extranjero estara bajo la jurisdicción exclusiva de ICE.
EXTRANJEROS BAJO ORDEN DE DEPORTACION
Si el extranjero detenido tiene orden de deportación, ICE lo mantendra detenido hasta que (1) ICE logre coordinar la deportación fisica de la persona al pais respectivo, (2) hasta que ICE apruebe una orden de supervisión, o (3) hasta que un juez de inmigracion reabra el caso de deportación en contra del extranjero y se logre obtener la libertad bajo fianza.
Orden de Supervisión
ICE puede darle libertad a un extranjero con orden de deportación bajo la figura de la orden de supervision. Este beneficio regularmente es utilizado por ICE cuando es difícil hacer efectiva la orden de deportación, o cuando hay razones humanitarias apremiantes que lo justifican. El caso tipico de la orden de supervisión es cuando hay una orden de deportación en contra de una persona de nacionalidad Cubana. Como es imposible hacer efectiva esa orden de deportación, ICE se ve en la necesidad de conceder ordenes de supervisión a estos individuos, dandoles asi libertad.
Es importante anotar que regularmente una persona con orden de supervisión tiene derecho a permiso de trabajo. Tambien es importante anotar que el extranjero debe cumplir cabalmente con todas las condiciones impuestas por ICE al aprobar la orden de supervisión, de lo contrario puede verse nuevamente detenido.
Reapertura del Caso
Cuando un extranjero tiene orden de deportación generalmente es porque un juez de inmigracion la impuso. El juez de inmigracion impone la orden de deportación al final de un proceso de deportación. La orden de deportación constituye el ultimo acto del juez en este tipo de proceso. Sin embargo, hay circunstancias en las que el extranjero que ha sido ordenado deportado puede solicitarle al juez de inmigracion que borre la orden de deportación y escuche nuevamente el caso. Hay unas razones limitadas que pueden ser alegadas por el extranjero como base de una solicitud de reapertura de su caso. Si alguna de esas razones no esta presente no hay lugar a este remedio.
En ocasiones, ICE le otorga libertad a extranjeros que han solicitado reapertura de sus casos. Generalmente esto se logra cuando hay consideraciones humanitarias extremas que justifican la libertad del extranjero a pesar de estar sujeto a una orden final de deportación.
Si el juez de inmigracion decide reabrir el caso de deportación, el extranjero debe solicitar una fianza para obtener su libertad. No todos los extranjeros califican para obtener una fianza. Esta determinación debe ser hecha por el extranjero junto con su abogado de inmigración.
EXTRANJEROS SIN ORDEN DE DEPORTACION
Cuando el extranjero no tiene orden de deportación y es detenido por ICE o por el CBP, lo mas seguro es que le sea iniciado un proceso de deportación. El proceso de deportación es iniciado por ICE, y presidido por un juez de inmigracion. Durante el proceso de deportación el extranjero seguira detenido por ICE.
En el momento en que el extranjero es detenido por ICE o por CBP, un oficial determinara si el extranjero califica para la libertad bajo fianza. Si esta opcion de libertad es otorgada, el extranjero debera pagar la fianza respectiva para que le sea reestablecida la libertad.
Si ICE le niega la libertad bajo fianza al extranjero, este podra solicitarle al juez de inmigracion que determine definitivamente el tema de la libertad bajo fianza.
Invitamos a nuestros lectores a enviarnos un correo electrónico o llamarnos.
Jeffrey C. Hammond y Carlos Mauricio Duque son abogados de inmigración en la firma de abogados del Doral, Duque & Hammond, P.A. Puede llamarlos al (305)436-0155 o escribirles a info@dhvisa.com Usted tambien puede visitar nuestra oficina: 3785 NW 82 AVE #201, Doral, Florida 33166.
Por favor tengan en cuenta que la contratación de un abogado es una decisión importante que no debe basarse solamente en un aviso publicitario o en cualquier información contenida en este articulo. Antes de que usted decida, pídanos que le enviemos información escrita gratuita sobre nuestras calificaciones y nuestra experiencia.
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